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2Abstract
While the literature tend to use in-house R&D as a proxy for absorption capacity and be silent about where
this ability of doing R&D has come from, this paper has tried to dig out the origin of absorption capacity after
defining it first as being able to conduct one’s own in-house R&D and second as being thereby able to
generate innovation outcomes. This paper distinguish three forms of foreign technology acquisitions based on
the unique archive data from Korea, such as know-how only licensing, know-how plus patent licensing, and
patent only licensing. This data show that the majority of the Korean firms started with know-how only
licensing, while licensing involving patents came later. Then, an econometric analysis finds that know-how
licensing associated with imported capital facility has led to firms to start their own in-house R&D, whereas
licensing involving patents only tend not to be significantly related to conducting R&D, which suggests
possibly substituting effect between foreign patent introduction and doing own R&D. A similar econometric
exercise shows that conducting own in-house R&D as well as licensing of know-how has led the firms to be
able to generate innovations or patent applications at later stages.
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31. Introduction
Absorptive capacity is recognized as one of the important binding constraints of economic development
of the late-comers since the influential and most widely article by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). For instance,
Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find by country panel regression that for foreign direct investment to
have impact, a country should have a certain level of absorption capacity. Specifically regarding Korea as one
of the most successful catching-up economies, scholars have also emphasized the importance of absorptive
capacity that enabled the Korean firms to learn and assimilate such external knowledge inflow (Keller, 1996;
Evenson and Westphal, 1995; Pack 1992; Dahlman 1992). However, the literature is somewhat silent about
where such absorption capacity comes from. There are many empirical researches that show importance of
absorption capacity by taking local R&D as its proxy but they are not providing explanation of what is
required before they become able to conduct their own R&D and generate innovative outcomes (patent
applications).
In the context of Korea, Korean firms started to conduct in-house R&D only from the mid 1980s but before
they reach this stage, there had been a long period of learning, assimilating, and adapting foreign technology
imported. Specifically, we note that the foreign technology flowed into Korea in the three form of licensing
contract of know-how, patented know-how and licensing of patented technology, and that these acquisition
had led to learning and formation of absorptive capacity that made firms start to conduct their own R&D
activities. In other words, this paper tries to explore the ‘missing link’ between foreign technology (and know-
how) acquisition (licensing) and the growth of indigenous R&D capability, and thereby dig the sources of
formation of absorptive capacity in a late-comer economy. Such reasoning is in line with the findings by many
researchers that access to external knowledge flows is especially important in such catch-up of the late-comer
firms (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997; Laursen and Meliciani, 2002; Park & Lee, 2006).
Cohen and Levinthal’s concept of absorptive capacity is a “dynamic” in the sense it is defined as “a firm’s
ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment” (1989, p. 569). Although R&D
spending is often used as a proxy of absorptive capacity of the firm, their notion consists of a learning process
which cannot be confined to R&D (Lane, 2006). The leading firms in Korea generally begin to learn
operational skills and elementary process technology before their own relevant capital investment commences.
They try to master this basic technology while the production facilities are built, and test operation takes place,
so that Korean engineers can take over the daily operation as soon as possible (Enos and Park, 1988; Kim,
1997). Often, foreign technologies from various sources are reorganized to fit into the latecomer’s
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paper is the first of its kind in applying econometric methods to the unique data of firm level foreign
technology acquisitions in a developing country, to show that firms go through a process of formation of
absorptive capacity long before they become able to conduct in-house R&D. Our analysis will shed a new
light to the importance of this “off-the-shelf” know-how transfer since the 1970s, as it had led to formation of
absorptive capacity in the process of assimilating basic operational skills and elementary operational
technology, and thereby equipped firms with the ability to integrate and adapt more advanced process or
design technology when they are imported later. Along this process of absorption, they become able to
conduct in-house R&D, which becomes active only from the mid 1980s in Korea, and to generate their own
innovations which we can measure partly by patent applications.
We have obtained a data of 3,141 foreign technology acquisition contracts, which covers all the cases
concluded by non-financial listed firms in Korea from 1970 to 1993. The value and uniqueness of this data set
is that the contracts are classified into three categories: the know-how-only acquisition, the know-how-and-
patent-rights acquisition, and the patent-rights only acquisition. This feature enables us to examine the
different outcome of the different types of foreign technology acquisition. The know-how-only typically
consists of technical services and training bundled with relevant documents, corresponding to basic
operational skills and elementary process technology mentioned above. The patent-rights-know-how consists
of licensing of technology protected by patents that come together with technical services, training and
documentations for technology, provided by the licensors. The patent-rights-only consists of patent right
licensing of (mostly advanced) technology. We measure the length of learning experience of each firm by
taking log of output accumulated since the year following its first acquisition of foreign know-how or patented
technology.
In sum, our operational definition of absorption capacity in the first stage is being able conduct their own
in-house R&D, and we will explore the link between diverse forms of foreign technology acquisition to
starting their own R&D. Then, another or final verification of successful consolidation of absorptive capacity
will be done by asking the question of what determines being able to innovative, and here will explore the link
between doing R&D and filing patent applications. In other words, absorptive capacity is captured in two
dimensions, including being able to in-house R&D and to become innovative. We apply the probit random
effect model suggested by Roberts and Tybout (1997) and also adopted in Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) in the
case of the Japanese firms to examine the effect of foreign technology acquisition on starting doing own R&D
and generating own patent applications.
52. Foreign Technology Acquisition in Korea
We follow Mendi (2007) and Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) in using the term “foreign technology acquisition”
to refer to our collection of 3,813 contracts where listed Korean firms obtained know-how and/or patent rights
from abroad. Table 1 shows that throughout 1970-1975, over two thirds of foreign technology contracts
consist of know-how only, and over 90% of contracts includes provision of know-how. These contracts
include not only information and blue prints in printed formats, but technical services and training.
Expatriate engineers usually come to Korea to make sure that initial operation in the new facilities goes as
planned. Sometimes selected Korean engineers are sent abroad for overseas training.
[ table 1A and 1B ]
Number of foreign technology acquisition contracts concluded by listed firms experience the most
drastic increase in the periods of 1976~1978 and 1982~1984, preceding large increase in the output of heavy
industries, such as electric and electronic equipments, chemicals, transport equipments, and general machinery.
Contracts concluded in these industries comprise over 70% of the total throughout the sample period of 1970-
1993. The only exception exists for 1976-1981, when heavy investment in social overhead capital increases
demand for technology in cement, and utility, i.e. electric power. However, on the average, over half of all
listed firms experience foreign technology acquisition; over two-thirds for the “heavy industries” mentioned
above and over 40% for the others. The ratios are very high compared to those of Japan in 1957-1970 period,
where only 52% of firms in “heavy” industry, and 19% for the others participate in the foreign technology
acquisitions (Kiyota and Okazaki, 2005, p.568)..
We also note that there is significant increase patent rights acquisition from 1976. According to Korea
Development Bank (1991) technology bundled with patent rights tend to be of higher value than the one
comprised of know-how only. This suggests that Korean firms may have been in demand for something more
than mere operation of manufacturing facilities once daily production was stabilized. Adoption of patented
technology may have been a means to complete absorption, assimilation, and improvement process initiated
by the investment and know-how acquisition, and also a means to prevent moral hazards on the part of foreign
firms when large scale capital investment did not follow (Arora, 1996). Interestingly, the number of firms
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45% of all listed firms in Korea have experience of concluding know-how only contracts, whereas the figure
goes down to 37% and 6% for patent rights bundled with know-how, or patent rights only. Then, it is
feasible to reason that the firms acquiring patent rights are those successful in assimilating basic operation
skills and elementary process technology through know-how acquisition.
Finally, it is important to note that a significant increase in inflow of foreign technology preceded R&D
efforts and innovation outcome in Korea, as shown by Figure 1. The increase in the number of foreign
technology acquisition took a sharp upward trend since the mid 960, whereas increase in total R&D and
Korean patent application by Korean nationals took a momentum only after the mid 1980s. It is only by mid
1980’s when private R&D became the core of national R&D input. The growth rate of patent applications
also follows a similar pattern, overtaking that of foreign technology acquisition in mid 1980’s.
The Korean government has two objectives when they enact the provision on foreign technology
acquisition in the Foreign Exchange Control Act in 1960. First, the government wants to make sure that
foreign exchange, a scarce resource after the Korean War, be used only for the technology that is of critical
value. Second, the government wants acquired technology to be the stepping stone on which Korean firms
can build on their own technological capabilities (The Korea Development Bank, 1991). In the 1960’s a
Korean firm needs government approval before concluding contracts with a foreign counterpart if the firm is
to receive technical assistance for a period of a year or longer and to make payment in foreign currency. The
relevant ministry, namely Ministry of Commerce and Industry, scrutinizes each of such application (The
Korea Development Bank, 1991).
In the 1970s Korean firms have built substantial productive and export capacities in labor-intensive light
industries, such as textiles, wigs, rubber footwear, and stuffed toys but the margins in these industries are low
and cash inflow insufficient to make relevant foreign debt services. Thus, both government and private sector
wanted to integrate backwards into intermediate goods; if intermediate goods can be secured within the
country, the need for foreign exchange should decrease in the long run. The Economic Development Plan is
drawn up to support the objective. A series of legislation is enacted to promote general machinery,
electronics, oil refinery and petrochemicals, transport equipment, steel, and shipbuilding industries (Byun and
Park, 1989). Likewise, the approval procedure for foreign technology in the above mentioned target sectors
are simplified.
By late 1970s, many of the initial entrants in the “heavy” industries acquired both physical capital and the
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quarter of gross domestic investment in Korea is spent on capital goods from abroad in the 1977-1979 period.
In 1978, automatic approval system was introduced for acquisition of foreign technology in sectors of general
and electric machinery, shipbuilding, chemicals, textiles and finance, if: (1) the duration of the contract are 3
years or shorter; (2) the down payment is USD 30,000 or less; (3) running royalty rate is 3% or lower; and (4)
fixed fee is USD 100,000 or less in total. From 1979, most sectors, other than weapons, explosives and
nuclear power, are allowed for automatic approval for projects meeting certain conditions. Figure 1 and 2
show a significant increase in the number of contracts for the year 1970 and the period 1978-1980.
The deregulation process continued in the 1980’s and 1990’s until the filing requirement is abolished in
1994. From 1984, the approval process is simplified to the filing-and-confirmation process. From 1988,
designated foreign exchange banks are entrusted to give confirmation on the foreign technology acquisition
filing under certain scale (The Korea Development Bank, 1991; Korea Industrial Technology Association,
1995, p.6).
Entering new industries typically imply manufacture of products new to Korea but common in the
developed world. According to Korea Development Bank (1991) survey on foreign technology acquisition of
1980’s, 55% is related to technology mature in developed countries, and 70% to expansion of product mix.
If we take into account the fact that 1970’s are marked by government driven entrance into industries that are
practically non-existent in Korea before, the numbers for the same questions are likely to be higher in the
1970’s. The Korean firms find knowledge embedded in manufacturing facilities insufficient for operation and
search for additional services and training, which the firms in the developed world are happy to provide them
for an appropriate price; there is not much point in keeping such mature technology “secret” when the
providing know-how can enable them to export large manufacturing facilities. The Japanese government’s
decision to move away from ‘pollution-prone’ ‘natural-resource-consuming’ heavy and chemical industries in
1971 forms a favorable environment for the Korean firms (Enos and Park, 1988).
3. Hypotheses: Building absorptive capacity through assimilation of foreign technology
Foreign technology acquisition is a process of interaction, rather than an event. Enos and Park (1988)
show us that even in the most successful cases, i.e. POSCO and Hanyang Chemicals, time and efforts are
necessary on the part of Korean firms before foreign technology is fully utilized. There exist three types of
foreign technology acquisitions in Korea during the sample period, depending on the form of technology
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typically consists of technical services, and training bundled with relevant documents. The patent-rights-
know-how consists of technical services, training and documentations, protected by patent system. The
patent-rights-only consists of patent right licensing.
The know-how only
Some of the typical know-how-only included in the sample are as follows: know-how for
manufacturing lubricants, cigarette filters, and epoxy resin paints; know-how for TV, radio, elevator, and
escalator assembly, know-how for production of piston rings, railway brakes, boilers and pumps (Korea
Industrial Technology Association, 1995). Sometimes the know-how-only contains more critical knowledge
such as operation skills for naphta cracking centers, high- and low-density polyethylene and VCM (vinyl
chloride monomer) production facilities, and diesel engine facilities; in general the more valuable,
fundamental technology is bundled with larger scale turn-key projects.
The acquired know-how is transferred on shop floor, on person to person basis from foreign expatriates to
Korean engineers, because it comes in the years when the transferee firm is newly adopting a production
process, without the capability to decipher tacit contents underlying the documented sources. The primary
purpose of foreign technology acquisition in this stage is to make efficient and effective investment and to
reach the design operating ratio as soon as possible. Although know-how, or tacit knowledge often
constitutes core competitive advantage in world leading firms (Cohen et al., 2000), the non-patented know-
how transferred from a leading firm to an unrelated party in a latecomer country generally contain basic
operational skills and elementary process technology, already mature and commonly known in the
industrialized world. Hoekman (2005) points to the fact that leading firms transfer such technology to
Korean firms in its early years of development because it is considered “off the shelf,” common and not much
of value in industrialized countries’ point of view. The Korea Development Bank (1991) survey confirms
that the know-how-only contracts generally contain basic operational skills and elementary process
technology. Korean firms often acquire know-how-only as a part of large scale turn-key investment projects.
Leading firms find it more profitable to accept such turn-key projects for a reasonable price than to refuse.
Even if Gulf Oil refuses to transfer the technology for producing polyethylene plastic resins to Hanyang
Chemicals, Dow Chemicals may, and there is no point in Gulf Oil to turn down the turn key project to keep
the well-known tacit knowledge to itself. What matters is the price and conditions of the transfer (Enos and
Park 1988, p.62). Many Japanese companies provide know-how-only’s to Korean firms in 1970’s and 1980’s
after their government makes it an official policy to move towards ‘clean’ and ‘brain-intensive’ industries. It
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Contrary to previous studies which assume that technology spill-over from imported capital goods, but
in line with Von Hippel (1994), this paper acknowledges the contribution of know-how-only contracts,
concluded in addition to investment contracts. The existence of well-prepared know-how-only contracts may
ensure transfer of the tacit knowledge to the latecomer. Korean engineers take over the daily operation
management as soon as possible, and in the process they are able to check if what they have learned is
sufficient. If the knowledge is insufficient, the turn-key contractor and/or other sources including R&D
specialty companies or equipment providers are contacted for additional information.
However, it is unlikely that the tacit knowledge contained in a few know-how-only contracts, imported
for the purpose of capital installation and start-up, be sufficient for immediate growth of innovative
capabilities or productivity. Silverberg (1991) as well as Cimoli and Dosi (1995) emphasize the fact the
imitation and diffusion of technology is a part of innovation process which essentially leads to creativity. It
should be noted that process implies certain passage in time. Even successful firms need sufficient amount of
time to accumulate experience, to move from “imitation to innovation,” in the words of Linsu Kim (1997).
Patent-rights plus know-how
Some of the typical patent-rights-know-how’s included in the sample are as follows: know-how and patent-
right licensing for production of acrylic fiber, and TPA (raw material for polyester); know-how and patent-
right licensing for production of cassette player and printed circuit board; know-how and patent-right
licensing for production of excavators, cranes, and automobile clutches (Korea Industrial Technology
Association, 1995). About 44 percent of all foreign technology acquisition contracts of listed firms in Korea
consist of patent rights bundled with know-how (“patent-rights-know-how contracts”). The ratio of this
category of foreign technology contracts increases significantly after mid 1970’s, when the basic
manufacturing operation stabilizes for the first-movers into the “target” industries, i.e. electric and electronic
equipments, chemicals, iron and steel, transportation equipments.
The patent-rights-know-how represents a stage in foreign technology acquisition where Korean firms still
rely on external sources of tacit knowledge for production process upgrading, but has accumulated certain
amount of shop floor experience operating newly imported foreign production facilities and have some basic
knowledge on the production process. As latecomers, Korean firms are under continuous pressure to attain
minimal level of productivity to survive in the international competition. Economy of scale and economy of
scope are two main sources of productivity improvement for Korean firms during the sample period.
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Economy of scale is a critical factor in productivity in the target industries of iron and steel, petrochemicals,
general machinery, electric equipments, and transportation equipments. Economy of scope is sought as a
way to generate profits without the danger of hitting the technological ceiling (Amsden, 2001, p.197). Firms
invest to manufacture more of the existing products or to add novel lines of products. There comes a time
when the tacit knowledge related to the product or process adopted by the latecomer is no longer as widely
known in the industrialized world, and the holders of technology impose a legal binding in transferring the
knowledge.
Patent-right only
Some of the typical patent-rights-only’s included in the sample are as follows: patent-rights licensing
for production of polycarbonate, one of the more sophisticated engineering plastic resins; patent-rights
licensing for production of automobile cooling system; and patent-rights licensing for production of color TV,
personal computers and PC graphics software (Korea Industrial Technology Association, 1995). As shown
in Table 1, only 6 percent of foreign technology acquisitions consist of patent-rights-only (“patent-rights-only
contracts”), where the latecomer is provided with only the legal rights for utilizing certain technology and not
the relevant tacit knowledge.
Patent documents do not contain information sufficient for new product manufacture or new process design.
Acquisitions of patent-rights-only imply that the transferee is equipped with certain level of R&D capability
and do not need expatriate engineers to make detailed account on how production process is to be carried out.
The latecomer is in possession of all or almost all of the necessary knowledge to adopt new production
process. The R&D capability may entail the formal activities carried out in well established institutes, as
well as tacit knowledge accumulated from making continuous improvements onto imported production
processes.
Most of patent-rights-only’s are concluded by firms in the sector of electric or electronic equipments.
This can be interpreted in two ways. First, electric and electronic equipments tend to be comprised of a large
number of patentable products, but Korean firms, as latecomers, are not the first to file the relevant patents,
and needs licenses to produce them. Second, this is the sector in which Korean firms have been most
successful in approaching the technological frontier; Koreans may not have been the first to develop the
relevant technology, but they have the ability to develop, and utilize the technology without anyone providing
relevant tacit knowledge.
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Summary and Hypothesis
In sum, there is a sequence in the form of foreign technology acquisition in Korea. Firms begin
with simple, mature technology and them move to the more complex, the advanced. Most firms, especially
in the 1960’s and 1970’s, choose to acquire know-how that could help them construct and operate
manufacturing facilities with which they are unfamiliar. The typical know-how bundle consists of
technological contents in printed form as well as related training and services provided on site, by expatriate
engineers. Sometimes Korean engineers are sent to the transferor’s firm to learn the implementation process.
Without sufficient background knowledge Korean firms find manuals and blueprints insufficient; it is critical
that someone comes to show how the new technology is to work. Technology inclusive of patent rights
comes later, when Koreans have better capabilities to decipher the codified content in the patents. Reliance
on expatriate engineers reduces over the years, at least in the more successful cases. Improvements
accumulate as firms gained experience on operation.
We find accounts of foreign technology acquisition in Enos and Park (1988) where POSCO and Hanyang
Chemicals become more and more swift in learning the tacit contents of process related technology as the
acquisitions are repeated. Less and less of the technology is mature, and more and more of it become
patented as acquisitions are repeated, but the Korean engineers’ experience in managing production facility
helps them learn faster. Formal R&D activities often begin after firms accumulate certain amount of
experience in assimilating foreign technology, after or sometime together with some know-how-only
acquisitions.
As technological capabilities of Korean firms advanced, the in-house R&D gains importance over foreign
technology acquisition because (1) foreign firms become more and more reluctant to provide core technology
to potential competitors in Korea, (2) competitiveness based on labor cost disappear, and (3) government
support for private R&D increases (OECD, 1996, pp.91-92). On national basis, private R&D activities
become significant from 1980’s but there are considerable amount of heterogeneities between firms. R&D
becomes important from early 1970’s in some of the leading firms.
[ table 2A 2B here ]
Table 2A show each case of the leading firms in Korea in terms of the dates and sequence regarding three
forms of foreign technology acquisition, in-house R&D, and finally own patent applications. In the case of
Samsung Electronics, it is in 1969 (the year of its establishment) that it contracted for know-how licensing,
followed by know-how plus patents and patent only licensing. Then, in 1976 it first record its R&D
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expenditure in its financial statement, and filed for patent applications in the year of 1978. While this seems to
be a typical or majority sequence in many companies in the table and in our whole sample, there are also cases
of firms taking different sequences, and the length of interval between events varies; for example, some firms
took more than 5 or 10 years to start R&D after initial acquisition of foreign technology, while it happened in
the same year in some other firms. We find that out of 764 firms, 385 firms (or 50.4%) have ever contracted
for foreign technology, and among them in the majority cases or 233 firms (or 233/385=60.5%), know-how
only was the first type of technology acquisition.
Now, table 2B show the mean and median numbers of years regarding the sequence of several events
involving technology acquisitions, R&D and innovations in our sample of 764 firms. First, the average
interval year between know-how acquisition and in-house R&D was 0.62 years (with 1 year as the median
figure), a little bit shorter than expected, and the average year between in-house R&D and first time patent
applications was 2.8 years (with 3 years as the median). Also, the average interval between know-how only
and patent applications was 3.6 years with 4 year as the median. However, the table also shows that the
average interval from patent-involved acquisition to R&D is negative, which means that some firms did in-
house R&D first and then later contracted for patent licensing.
Now, regarding being able to generate innovative outcomes or patents, it took an average of 2.8 years after
conducting R&D, and 3.6 years and 3.1 years after licensing of know-how only acquisition and know-how
plus patent acquisition, respectively. From patent only acquisition to its own patent applications, it took an
average of -1.2 years, which means that many firms generated their own patents before they contracted for
patent licensing.
The above discussion indicates to us two things. First, the initial foreign technology acquisitions and in-
house R&D activities seem to have happened with a relatively short interval or in a simultaneous manner,
depending upon the types of acquisitions. This means that just conducting in-house R&D might not be a
sound proof of having absorptive capacity, whereas it is just a beginning of a longer term process of building
it. Second, it took roughly 3 years to generate patent applications after starting R&D or acquisition of know-
how-based technologies. Thus, one might reason that being able to generate its own patents might be the final
proof of having absorptive capacity or marks the end of the process of forming the capacity.
The above reasoning leads us to form a two-stage hypothesis about the origin of absorptive capacity, which
states that having or not absorptive capacity can be verified by either or both of being able to conduct R&D
and to generate patents.
Thus, our first hypothesis is that acquisition of foreign technology in these three forms had helped the firms
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learn and assimilate foreign technology and thus motivated them to start their own in-house R&D. We will test
this by estimating a probit model with doing or not the R&D as the dependent variable. In other words, our
first definition of absorptive capacity is being able to conduct its own R&D, and we hypothesize that those
firms who acquired foreign technology by licensing were able to build up their absorption capacity, which led
them toward their own R&D. In this regard, one important this is that we suspect there will be some difference
among the three forms of acquisition, specifically between the modes involving know-how licensing and the
mode with patent licensing only without know-how only. The reasoning is that patent licensing and in-house
R&D might be substitutes each other, and thus firms licensing for foreign patents might feel less need for
doing their own R&D to develop such technologies. Also, it is based on the fact that many firms conducted
R&D first even before they contracted for patent licensing. Actually, as the table 2B shows, the average
sequence is that patent licensing came later than in-house R&D with an interval of 3.6 years on average.
Then, the next hypothesis is about whether these firms have become able to succeed in innovations, which
can be measured by patent applications. We take patent applications as a final evidence of successful
consolidation of absorptive capacity. Econometrically, we hypothesize that the activities of in-house R&D is
primarily responsible for being able generate patent applications, whereas we also examine the direct linkages
between the three forms of acquisition to patent generations. Again, we hypothesize that while there would be
a positive linkage between acquisition of know-how or know-how plus patents to patent generations, licensing
of patent only would not lead to firms’ own patent generations. This hypothesis is consistent with table 3B
showing that while it took an average of 3 years for firm to go for patent application after they contracted for
know-how only or know-how plus patent licensing, firms had already applied for their own patents on average
1.2 years before they first contracted for patent only licensing. This test is also done using a probit model with
patent applications as a dummy variable.
In this exercise, one caution needs to be discussed regarding the suitability of patent applications as the
evidence of being innovative. As is well-known, patents tend to reflect and express not tacit but codified
knowledge. However, as verified in Jung and Lee (2010) more tacit-knowledge sectors and firms also
generate patents, although not as many per unit of R&D expenditure as explicit-knowledge-oriented sectors.
That is why we go for a probit estimation method with a dummy variable taking the value of one for any
positive number of patent applications, rather than regular regressions with the number of patents as the
dependent variable.
4. Data and Methodology
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The Data and their sources
Four distinctive sets of data are combined in this paper to examine the relationship between foreign
technology acquisition and firm performance in listed companies: 1) foreign technology acquisition data from
1970 to 1993, collected by Korea Industrial Technology Association (KOITA) and Ministry of Strategy and
Finance (MOSF); 2) financial data from 1973 to 1996, compiled by Korea Information Service (KIS), Korea
Stock Exchange, or Korea Listed Companies’Association; 3) patent application data from 1973 to 1996,
provided by Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information System (KIPRIS); and 4) the list of 30 largest
chaebol groups and its affiliates from 1973 to 1996, revised each year by the Hankook Ilbo (1986) or the Fair
Trade Commission.
The KOITA collection presents summary of all the foreign technology acquisition contracts filed before
1994, the year compulsory filing requirements were abolished. The data set is “complete” in the sense that
all firms were compelled to report conclusion of foreign technology acquisition contract where payment was
to be made in foreign currency. Over half of the data consists of know-how only contracts, where tacit
knowledge is the technology of interest. Know-how acquisition related to the construction of POSCO steel
mills, petrochemical complexes, or Hyundai gasoline engine facilities are documented the KOITA data.
KOITA collection represents larger companies that favored arm’s length purchase of foreign technology to
enhance their knowledge based assets, and these are the ones that have dominated technological advancement
in Korea (Kim 1997, Amsden 2001).
[ table 3]
As shown by Table 3, the document contains for each contract the name of the transferee and transferor,
the nationality of the transferor firm, the term of the contract, the date the contract was reported to the
authority, a simple description of the technological content and format, i.e. know-how, patent right, or
trademark right, and the amount of royalties to be paid. There exists summary of 8,766 contracts from 1960
to 1993, and the contracts from 1970 to 1993 comprise 98% of the total, 8,587 in number. Of these, 4,175
(49%) are concluded by firms that were listed at some point between 1970 and 1996, 2,780 are concluded by
non-listed-but-externally-audited firms, and 1,831 are unidentifiable. By selecting the contracts concluded 3
years ahead of the list date to the delist date, 3,813 contracts are left in the sample (44% of 8,587).
KIS provides the most extensive information on financial statements of Korean firms with information
on their list and delist date. Almost all financial statements prepared by listed firms after 1980 are included in
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the database; however, the database is incomplete in its collection of financial statements in 1970s, and a few
firms that closed business before 1986 are also missing. The financial statements provided by Korea Stock
Exchange, or Korea Listed Companies’Association; are used to fill the gap.
KIPRIS provides information on all Korean patent applications filed since 1945. This paper uses
61,487 patent applications, which are identified to have been filed by listed companies between 1973 and
1996, using Korea Intellectual Property Office Database.
Information provided by Fair Trade Commission and a major newspaper company as well as the results
of Lee et al. (2008) are combined to identify chaebol affiliates each year. From 1987, Fair Trade
Commission has designated 30 largest conglomerates, or chaebols, and their affiliate firms each April. For
1983, 1984, and 1985 the Hankook Ilbo (1986), one of major daily newspaper company in Korea, provides
report on the 50 largest chaebol groups and their affiliates.
The method of data construction
Except for the KIS database, data sources do not provide firm ID other than its name, which tend to
change over time. Because names of listed firms often constitute assets of its own right, small firms are
observed to use an old name of a listed firm that changed its own. This often causes confusion among
researchers that uses a long panel.
This paper uses systematic method of data construction to identify each firm without errors. First,
Korea Stock Exchange (1974, 1975) and Korea Listed Companies’Association (1976-1981) are compared to
Jung (2008, p.7)2 to identify the firms listed in Korea Stock Exchange at each year end, from 1974 to 1980.
Second, this list is compared to KIS database; those identified with its counterpart in KIS database are given
KIS firm ID number, those identified to be missing from KIS database are given an ID number distinct from
the KIS ID set. Financial data, i.e. asset amount, from each database is used in the process if necessary.
Third, for the companies that are listed any time between 1970 and 1996, change in firm name is traced using
Korea Stock Exchange (1974, 1975), Korea Listed Companies Association (1982-1997), and each firm
websites. Fourth, the listed companies are identified among licensees in KOITA foreign technology
association database, as well as patent applicants of KIPRIS, and chaebol affiliates, using above mentioned
history of firm names. Fifth, the four distinctive databases are combined using firm ID number and year.
According to the survey carried out by Korea Development Bank (1991, p.213) on foreign
2 Jung (2008, p.7) presents the number of firms listed at each year end with information on firms that listed or delisted.
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technology acquisition of 1980s, almost 90% of firms are able to absorb the technological contents 3 years
after the conclusion of the contract. In the 1st to 3rd year of technology acquisition, 30~50% of firms still
need to learn from expatriate engineers to apply the knowledge to the new environment. It is likely that
application period tends to be longer when technological capabilities of the transferee is lower, i.e. Korean
firms in 1970s. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Korean firms needed 3 years on average to before
fully absorbed, assimilated and improved the foreign technology so that it could function well in the new
improvement. To combine each three year into one period, this paper: 1) uses three year sum for foreign
technology acquisitions and patent applications for each period; and 2) converts financial data into real KRW
3 year average applying GDP deflators to annual data.
Estimation Method and Variables
We use a probit model with random effect, using model specifications based on Bernard and Jensen (1999)
and Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) to examine the effects of foreign technology acquisition and accumulated
learning on formation of absorption (and innovation) capacity. Our key question is what makes firms to start
doing their own in-house R&D, and thus conducting R&D is captured by a binary variable which takes the
value of one at the first year a firm established in-house R&D facility. As pointed out by Nickell (1981), in a
binary choice model with lagged dependent variable, parameter estimations are often biased and inconsistent.
Among several strategies to handle this problem from unobserved heterogeneity, we follow Roberts and
Tybout (1997) to use the probit random effect model suggested above and also adopted in Kiyota and Okazaki
(2005).
The model specification is as follows:
(1) Yit = α + βZi,t-1 + γChari,t-1 + δYi,t-1 + ηi + μit
where ηi is random effect and μit is pure disturbance term (ηi + μit = εit).
 Yit is a dummy variable that take the value of one if the firm conducts in-house R&D (or generates
patent applications) at year t and zero otherwise in the case of R&D equation (in the case of patent equation).
 Zi,t-1 include the key variable of our interests, such as variable representing several forms of
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technology acquisition (licensing), as well as in-house R&D dummy in the case of patent application
equations. Technology acquisitions are entered as one of the dummies corresponding to know-how-only,
patent-rights-know-how, and patent-rights-only, respectively. We also experiment with some dummy
combining two forms of acquisition against the other, as well as interactions of these forms with R&D.
 Chari,t-1 is a vector of control (firm characteristics) variables. Firm size variable (= natural log of total
assets), firm age variable (=log of firm age as of (t-1)), capital-labor ratio, industry dummies, and period
dummies are used.
Further explanations about the variables are summarized in table 3. Some notes follow.
[ table 4]
We use log of real asset amount as firm size dummy because it is better at representing a firm’s propensity
towards capital investment in absolute amount, than sales amount or number of employees, and capital
investments often constitute an important part of absorbing and assimilating foreign technology. We also
control for firm age, which is the number of years elapsed after establishment; firm age is observed to
influence innovative outcome and productivity (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004a, 2004b). Capital-labor ratio
indicates not only the level of past investments but also kind of technology employed by a firm just before the
acquisition of foreign technology (Arrow et al., 1961). Industry dummies are given based on KSIC two-digit
code. Since each period in our study consists of three-years, a three-year average is used to represent all
variables, and we use a dummy variable representing each 3-year period As mentioned before, it is judgment
by the bank giving out the loans for technology investment or acquirement for the Korean that it seems to take
an average of three years to absorb foreign technology during the sample period (Korea Development Bank,
1991, p.213).
5. The Results: Foreign Technology Acquisition to in-house R&D
What makes firms to be able to conduct R&D
Table 5 present the results of the estimation of panel probit random effect models to find out what has made
the firms being able to conduct R&D. In other words, we are interested in which types among the three types
of foreign technology acquisition are directly related to formation of in-house R&D capability. Each type
dummy for each of three modes is included as a regressor, separately. First in table 5A, the key explanatory
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variables are inserted in its one-period lagged values, together with other control variables which are lagged
too. Columns of 2, 3, and 4 present the results for each type dummy, respectively. They show very clearly that
the dummy for the know-how acquisition in the preceding period has a positive and significant impacts on the
probability of being able to conduct R&D, whereas two other types have no significant impacts. To make sure
the robustness of the results, we have created another dummy for either type2 or 3 and run regressions with
this new dummy and the original dummy for know-how only. These results are shown in the first three
columns of the table. The results are consistent with the separate regressions for each type; while know-how
dummy is significant, patent dummy is not.
Next, in table 5B, we have tried all the current values of key variables (three types of licensing), while
keeping the lagged value of other control variables. The results show that the current values of licensing for
know-how only and know-how plus patents has significant and positive impact on the probably of doing in-
house R&D, whereas a dummy for patent only is not significant. The results in the first column with a
dummy for these first two types of licensing are consistent with the results with a separate dummy for the two
types of acquisitions.
These results with lagged and current values of licensing types are consistent with the discussion in the
preceding section and the table 2B that R&D and acquisition of know-how and in-house R&D proceeded with
a little interval or simultaneously, whereas patent only licensing came 3 years after in-house R&D. The results
also confirms the substituting relationship between in-house R&D and patent licensing.
[table 5A, 5B]
From in-house R&D to being able to generate patents
The next step is to see what makes firm to be successfully innovative, which is defined as being able to
generate patent applications. Our key interests are on the effectiveness of in-house R&D activities as well as
possibly different impact of three types of foreign technology acquisition. The regression results in table 6
first confirm clearly the importance of doing in-house R&D as its coefficients are positive and significant in
all specifications. In other models in table 6A, we have included a dummy for the first two types ( know-
how only and know-how plus patents, as well as a dummy for the third type (patents only or), separately or
together. Again, while the dummy involving know-how is positive significant, the dummy for patent licensing
is not. These results are consistent with the information about sequencing and interval shown in table 3B, such
that it took 3 or 4 years for firms licensing for know-how with or without patents to generate their own patent
applications, whereas licensing for patent only came on average 1.2 years (with 3 years as median) after firms
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being able to generate their own patents.
Also, we find that the interactions of either the type dummy with R&D dummy are not significant. These
results imply that while R&D is primarily responsible for generating patents, previous learning experience
with know-how acquisition is still important as independent factor affecting innovation probability. This is
interesting since the preceding results shown that those firms who licensed for know-how only acquisition are
exactly those who are being able to conduct R&D. This can be interpreted as implying that learning from
foreign technology tend to increase the probability of success in innovation, as in-house R&D activities do.
The above results stay on when we replace the R&D dummy with the amount of R&D expenditure in next
round of regressions in table 6B. The results in table are exactly the same as the preceding table. Thus,
again they confirms the importance of in-house R&D, as well as the fact that having experience with foreign
know-how learning tend to increase the success probability of independent R&D effort, regardless how much
money you spend on the effort.
[table 6A, 6B]
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
While the literature tend to use in-house R&D as a proxy for absorption capacity and be silent about
where this ability of doing R&D has come from, this paper has tried to dig out the origin of absorption
capacity after defining it first as being able to conduct one’s own in-house R&D and second as being thereby
able to generate innovation outcomes. This paper distinguish three forms of foreign technology acquisitions
based on the unique archive data from Korea, such as know-how only licensing, know-how plus patent
licensing, and patent only licensing. This data show that the majority of the Korean firms started with know-
how only licensing, while licensing involving patents came later. Then, an econometric analysis finds that
know-how licensing associated with imported capital facility has led to firms to start their own in-house R&D,
whereas licensing involving patent only tend not to be significantly related to conducting R&D, which
suggests possibly substituting effect between foreign patent introduction and doing own R&D. A similar
econometric exercise shows that conducting own in-house R&D has led the firms to be able to generate
innovations or patent applications at later stages, and also that having experience with foreign know-how
licensing tend to increase the success probably of innovation.
This study suggests that building absorption capacity is a dynamic process that takes certain time and effort,
involves tacit knowledge (know-how) more than explicit knowledge (patents), and cannot be successful
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without getting access to foreign knowledge-basis. Then, for this reason, we can say that just starting in-house
R&D cannot be an evidence of having such capacity. Beginning of the process may be either acquisition of
foreign technology or in-house R&D, and the ‘first’ end of the process would be the time when a firm
registers an evidence of its own innovations. Then, this study gives us a clue about the question of how long it
takes to build absorption capacity, which is not answered by any existing studies. We find that it takes at least
3 to 4 years in the case of this sample of Korean firms when we count the period from the first year of know-
how licensing to the first year of patent applications
In general, this study shows that before firms being able to do in-house R&D and innovations, they were
learning process involving foreign technology, especially tacit knowledge in the form of know-how, which is
the origin of the absorptive capacity. Also we have learned that building absorptive capacity is a dynamic
process that takes some time. While this sounds natural, this study is the first of its kind to verify the concrete
linkage between foreign technology acquisition and formation of absorptive capacity.
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Figure 1: Foreign Technology Acquisition and R&D
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995), and National Science and Technology
Information Service webpage (http://sts.ntis.go.kr)
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Table 1A: Technology Acquisitions by 3 Types over 1970-93: a complete list
Source: Tabulation using the data from Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995)
Note: These are the number of non-financial listed firms included in the sample used; for 1973~1993 period, firms scheduled for IPO
within the next 3 years are included because their data are available.
No of
Listed
firms
Technolo
gies
acquired
(left)
Know-
how-only
acquired
Patent-
rights-
know-how
acquired
Patent-
rights-only
acquired
No of
firms
acquiring
foreign
technology
Know-how-
only
Patent-
rights-
know-how
Patent-
rights-only
1970 35 29 26 3 0 17 16 2 0 1.7
1971 36 13 10 3 0 10 8 3 0 1.3
1972 43 19 12 6 1 18 12 6 1 1.1
1973 126 15 12 3 0 13 10 3 0 1.2
1974 217 25 20 5 0 21 16 5 0 1.2
1975 292 39 16 18 5 28 14 16 5 1.4
1976 313 47 26 20 1 30 18 16 1 1.6
1977 316 37 25 12 0 23 15 11 0 1.6
1978 314 96 45 48 3 49 23 32 3 2.0
1979 303 94 44 48 2 62 37 31 2 1.5
1980 300 93 43 42 8 60 32 30 3 1.6
1981 295 96 49 36 11 70 40 32 6 1.4
1982 315 156 67 76 13 84 41 48 7 1.9
1983 344 151 79 66 6 96 62 46 4 1.6
1984 423 186 102 78 6 105 71 50 4 1.8
1985 537 196 83 98 15 105 61 55 7 1.9
1986 578 220 100 109 11 119 67 63 10 1.8
1987 605 260 132 113 13 116 85 60 10 2.2
1988 605 334 165 142 27 143 101 77 14 2.3
1989 613 356 175 164 15 131 87 72 9 2.7
1990 639 409 209 181 19 134 85 78 7 3.1
1991 644 297 153 119 23 118 78 60 10 2.5
1992 675 275 135 114 26 109 74 55 11 2.5
1993 671 370 178 163 26 113 81 60 10 3.3
Year
Number of
Average
number of
technologie
s acquired
per firm
Number of firms acquiring
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Table 1B: Number of Technology Acquisition Contracts Concluded by Listed Firms
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995), National Science and Technology Information Service webpage
(http://sts.ntis.go.kr), and Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information Office webpage (http://www.kipris.or.kr/)
Note: * “Share(%)” in the row of “R&D/Sales(%)” refer to the amount of R&D carried out by firms with past experience of
foreign technology acquisition over all R&D expenditure. Likewise, “Share(%)” in the row of “No. of Patents” refer to the number of
patent applications filed by firms with past experience in foreign technology acquisition over all patent applications.
** “Number of Firms” in the row of “R&D/Sales(%)” or “No. of Patents” refer to number of firms that have R&D expenditure or
patent application for any time between 1970 and 1993.
*** Number of patent applications.
No. of contracts concluded Share(%)* Number of firms** Share of firms(%)
1970 1976 1982 1988 1970 1970 1976 1982 1988 1970
Industry ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1975 1981 1987 1993 1993 1975 1981 1987 1993 1993
Electric &
Electronics
22 83 349 869 1,323 15.7 17.9 29.9 42.6 34.7 67 31 98 68.4 31.6 100.0
Chemicals 35 85 275 356 751 25.0 18.4 23.5 17.4 19.7 90 46 136 66.2 33.8 100.0
Transport
Equipment
s
17 57 111 192 377 12.1 12.3 9.5 9.4 9.9 27 8 35 77.1 22.9 100.0
General
Machinery
28 39 86 149 302 20.0 8.4 7.4 7.3 7.9 18 4 22 81.8 18.2 100.0
Other 38 199 348 475 1,060 27.1 43.0 29.8 23.3 27.8 206 266 472 43.6 56.4 100.0
Total 140 463 1,169 2,041 3,813 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 408 355 763 53.5 46.5 100.0
Knowhow
Only 96 232 563 1,015 1,906 68.6 50.1 48.2 49.7 50.0 347 416 763 45.5 54.5 100.0
Knowhow
+ Patent
Rights
38 206 540 883 1,667 27.1 44.5 46.2 43.3 43.7 281 482 763 36.8 63.2 100.0
Patent
Rights
Only
6 25 64 136 231 4.3 5.4 5.5 6.7 6.1 42 721 763 5.5 94.5 100.0
R&D/Sales
(%)
0.08 0.14 0.24 0.82 0.74 73.6 76.3 91.3 96.0 95.3 649 114 763 85.1 14.9 100.0
No. of
Patents***
49 332 6,304 46,039 52,724 59.2 76.2 96.9 99.1 98.7 316 447 763 41.4 58.6 100.0
Total
With
acquired
technology
1970~1993
Without
acquired
technology
1970~1993
Total
With
acquired
technology/
R&D/
patent app.
Without
acquired
technology/
R&D/
patent app.
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Table 2A: From Acquisition of foreign technologies to In-house R&D and Patent applications
Cases of selected Korean firms
Name
Year of
Establish
-ment
Industry
1st know-
how-only
contract
1st patent
rights+know-
how contract
1st patent
rights-only-
contract
1st R&D 1st patent
application
Samsung
Electronics 1969
Electric &
Electronics 1969 1975 1972 1976 1978
LG Electronics 1959
Electric &
Electronics 1966 1967 1975 1976 1976
Daewoo Electronics 1971
Electric &
Electronics 1968 1982 1975 1975 1982
Hynix
Semiconductor 1949
Electric &
Electronics 1983 1983 1986 1983 1985
Hyundai Motors 1967 TransportEquipments 1968 1977 1986 1975 1983
Kia Motors 1944 TransportEquipments 1966 1967 N/A 1975 1979
LG Semiconductor 1989
Electric &
Electronics 1983 1980 1992 1989 1985
Samsung SDI 1969
Electric &
Electronics 1985 1978 1983 1974 1976
POSCO 1968 Iron andSteel 1970 1971 N/A 1983 1977
Samsung Electro-
Mechanics 1973
Electric &
Electronics 1982 1983 N/A 1975 1982
Kolon 1957 Chemicals 1972 1980 1989 1980 1976
LG Chemicals 1947 Chemicals 1970 1971 1979 1975 1970
28
Table 2B: From Acquisition of foreign technologies to In-house R&D and Patent applications
Calculation of Average Intervals by Pair-wise and Sequence of the Events
From: To: Mean Median Min Max No. firms
know-how R&D 0.62 1 -16 16 296
know-how +patents R&D -0.25 0 -14 17 240
Patents only R&D -3.6 -3 -17 16 39
R&D Patents 2.8 3 -20 18 245
know-how Patents 3.6 4 -19 22 146
know-how +patents Patents 3.1 3 -14 19 122
Patents only Patents -1.2 -3 -9 13 15
share 1 share 2
Total Sample firms 764 100.0%
No. of firms ever 385 50.4% 100.0%
acquired foreign Tech.
Those who started with 233 60.5%
know-how only licensing
Thos who started with 135 35.1%
know-how + patents
Sources: Authors from their data base.
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Table 3: Foreign Technology Acquisition Data Sample: The image of the original data book
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995)
No Transferee Transferor Term
(Year)
Report Date Technological
Content
Type of
Technology
Payment Note
27 Taihan Electric
Wire Co., Ltd.
Marcon
Electronics
(Japan)
3 Dec. 10,
1968
Weak Current
Condenser
Know-how
(Data and
Information,
Technological
Training)
Deposit:
USD 25,000
Royalty:
2.5%
Transfer
Completed
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Table 4: Summary and description of Variables
Dependent Variables
R&D dummy = 1 if a firm conducted R&D in the current (three-year) period.
Patent dummy = 1if a firm has applied for more than zero patents in the current period
Variables related to foreign technology acquisitions:
know-how only dummy (Type1) =1 if the firm acquires foreign know-how-only
know-how+patent dummy(Type2) =1 if the firm acquires foreign know-how plus patent-rights
Patent only dummy (Type3) =1 if the firm acquires foreign patent-rights-only
Patent dummy (Type2 or32) = 1 if the firm acquire patents (either alone or together with know-how)
Know-how dummy (Type1 or 2) = 1 if the firm acquire know-how (either alone or together with patents)
size of R&D expenditure
ln(R&D expenditure) t-1 , where it takes a three-year average of the
amount when it is greater than 0, and it is defined as ln (0.5) if R&D
expenditure t = 0.
Control Variables:
p_age t, : firm age ln(firm age)t, , based on firm age as of end of (t)
p_asset t-1, : firm size ln(asset amount) t-1 is in real thousand KRW
p_CRt-1 : capital-labor ratio ln(capital-labor ratiot ) = ln(fixed assets excluding landt / employee t)
p_ind t : industry dummy given according to KSIC two digit-code
p_period t : period dummy
period 1: 1970~1972, period 2: 1973~1975, period 3: 1976~1978,
period 4: 1979~1981, period 5: 1982~1984, period 6: 1985~1987,
period 7: 1988~1990, period 8: 1991~1993, period 9: 1994~1996
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Table 5: What determines the probability of getting to conduct in-house R&D : Panel Probit Random Effects
Part A: With Lagged Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know-how-only dummyt-1 0.325*** 0.329***
(3.425) (3.524)
Patent-rights+knowhow dummyt-1 0.09
(0.849)
Patent-rights-only dummyt-1 -0.023
(-0.0742)
Technology-including -patent-rights dummyt-1 0.021
(0.193)
R&D dummyt-1 1.173*** 1.173*** 1.164*** 1.165***
(13.710) (13.730) (13.570) (13.580)
ln(Total assets)t-1 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.144*** 0.151***
(3.516) (3.597) (4.176) (4.429)
Capital-labor ratiot-1 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
(-1.949) (-1.950) (-1.962) (-1.973)
ln(Firm age)t 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.078
(1.006) (1.006) (1.021) (1.018)
Constant -3.415*** -3.433*** -3.356*** -3.461***
(-5.104) (-5.181) (-5.023) (-5.220)
Industry dummyt Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummyt Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206
Number of firms 754 754 754 754
Log-likelihood -1,174 -1,174 -1,180 -1,180
Wald chi2 867.1 867.3 860.2 859.9
prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lrtest(chibar2) 5.160 5.150 6.450 6.610
p(rho=0) 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.005
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Part B: With Current Values
(1 (2) (3) (4)
Know-how-only dummyt
Patent-rights+knowhow dummy1 이걸 가지고 표 만들기
Patent-rights-only dummyt
Technology-including –know-how dummyt
R&D dummyt-1 1.173*** 1.173*** 1.164*** 1.165***
(13. 10) (13.730) (13.570) (13.580)
ln(Total assets)t-1 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.144*** 0.151***
(3.516) (3.597) (4.176) (4.429)
Capital-labor ratiot-1 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
(-1.949) (-1.950) (-1.962) (-1.973)
ln(Firm age)t 0.076 0.076 0.078 0. 78
(1.006) (1.006) (1.021) (1.018)
Constant -3.415*** -3.433*** -3.356*** -3.461***
(-5.104) (-5.181) (-5.023) (-5.220)
Industry dummyt Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummyt Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206
Number of firms 754 54 54 754
Log-likelihood -1,174 -1,174 -1,180 -1,180
Wald chi2 867.1 867.3 860.2 859.9
prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lrtest(chibar2) 5.160 5.150 6.450 6.610
p(rho=0) 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.005
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Table 6A: What determines of the Probability of getting to have innovations : with R&D dummy
Dependent Variable Patent application dummyt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel Probit Random Effects
R&D dummyt-1 0.194** 0.189** 0.191** 0.188** 0.210** 0.193** 0.206**
(2.140) (2.105) (2.121) (2.092) (2.148) (2.023) (2.068)
Know-how-only dummyt-1 0.344*** 0.337*** 0.418*** 0.416**
(4.388) (4.241) (2.664) (2.561)
(Know-how-only*R&D dummy)t-1 -0.095 -0.102
(-0.545) (-0.557)
Technology-including -patent-rights
dummyt-1
0.108 0.049 0.116 0.031
(1.214) (0.541) (0.637) (0.161)
(Technology-including-patent-
rights*R&D dummy)t-1
-0.01 0.023
(-0.0510) (0.110)
Patent application dummyt-1 0.871*** 0.885*** 0.873*** 0.885*** 0.885*** 0.873*** 0.884***
(8.597) (8.866) (8.633) (8.862) (8.858) (8.633) (8.854)
Capital-labor ratiot-1 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-3.654) (-3.700) (-3.618) (-3.680) (-3.705) (-3.618) (-3.681)
ln(Total assets)t-1 0.409*** 0.363*** 0.395*** 0.358*** 0.364*** 0.395*** 0.359***
(8.944) (7.961) (8.435) (7.716) (7.964) (8.435) (7.719)
ln(Firm age)t 0.064 0.064 0.067 0.065 0.063 0.067 0.065
(0.692) (0.701) (0.726) (0.716) (0.699) (0.726) (0.715)
Constant -9.646*** -8.855*** -9.383*** -8.765*** -8.881*** -9.384*** -8.789***
(-10.07) (-9.318) (-9.666) (-9.120) (-9.319) (-9.665) (-9.121)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206
Number of firms 754 754 754 754 754 754 754
Log-likelihood -1,285 -1,276 -1,285 -1,276 -1,276 -1,285 -1,276
Wald chi2 576.0 605.0 583.8 607.0 605.1 583.8 607.1
prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lrtest(chibar2) 23.06 22.02 21.55 19.74 20.02 21.53 19.75
p(rho=0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ***, **, and * in the cells indicate the levels of significance of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6B: What determines of the Probability of getting to have innovations : with R&D expenditure
Dependent Variable Patent application dummyt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
R&D expendituret-1 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(3.388) (3.346) (3.354) (3.326) (3.321) (3.011) (3.129)
Know-how-only dummyt-1 0.341*** 0.335*** 0.408*** 0.415***
(4.372) (4.233) (3.308) (3.265)
(Know-how-only*R&D)t-1 -0.009 -0.011
(-0.698) (-0.808)
Technology-including -patent-rights
dummyt-1
0.103 0.042 0.072 -0.003
(1.158) (0.471) (0.502) (-0.0203)
(Technology-including-patent-
rights*R&D)t-1
0.004 0.006
(0.274) (0.403)
Patent application dummyt-1 0.878*** 0.890*** 0.880*** 0.889*** 0.892*** 0.880*** 0.890***
(8.682) (8.931) (8.713) (8.923) (8.942) (8.707) (8.933)
Capital-labor ratiot-1 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-3.571) (-3.614) (-3.540) (-3.598) (-3.631) (-3.526) (-3.598)
ln(Total assets)t-1 0.379*** 0.335*** 0.366*** 0.331*** 0.337*** 0.366*** 0.332***
(8.232) (7.305) (7.794) (7.107) (7.332) (7.781) (7.126)
ln(Firm age)t 0.057 0.058 0.06 0.059 0.056 0.061 0.058
(0.629) (0.645) (0.663) (0.659) (0.627) (0.671) (0.650)
Constant -8.591*** -7.861*** -8.367*** -7.792*** -7.913*** -8.353*** -7.829***
(-9.029) (-8.334) (-8.707) (-8.189) (-8.353) (-8.685) (-8.198)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206
Number of firms 754 754 754 754 754 754 754
Log-likelihood -1,282 -1,273 -1,281 -1,272 -1,272 -1,281 -1,272
Wald chi2 593.3 620.2 600.3 621.7 622.2 600.0 623.9
prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lrtest(chibar2) 19.98 17.68 18.83 17.51 17.55 18.82 17.30
p(rho=0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ***, **, and * in the cells indicate the levels of significance of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
